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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the various factors which determine capital structure in non-financial companies listed on 
Karachi Stock Exchange. Panel data of 113 companies spanning over a period of 10 years is used as our sample. 
Data is obtained from balance sheet analysis of non-financial listed companies, published by State Bank of 
Pakistan. Panel data estimation models are employed for data analysis. Our results reveal the factors contributing 
to determination of capital structure in Pakistan. Profitability and liquidity are negatively related to debt ratio, 
while free cash flows, interest rates and earnings volatility are positively related to debt ratio. Firm size, growth 
opportunities, non-debt tax shields and asset tangibility appear to have no significant impact on debt ratio. 
Keywords：capital structure, debt ratio, profitability, liquidity, free cash flows, tangibility, firm size, earnings 
volatility, interest rate, non-debt tax shields, growth opportunities, Pakistan 
 
1. Introduction 
Decisions regarding the determination of optimal capital structure are very important for management. Capital 
structure can be defined as “the mix of securities and financing sources used to finance real investment by 
corporations” (Myers, 2003, p.2). Firms can be financed through debt or equity, each with its own unique 
characteristics. Debt has advantage in form of tax deductible nature of interest payments. However, this 
advantage is coupled with increased financial distress which may lead the firm into bankruptcy. Similarly, equity 
financing has its own pros and cons. Equity does not put financial burden on business but its issuance may 
convey a signal to investors that the stocks of company are overpriced. 
Determining the firm value-maximizing capital structure is not easy because the extant theories of 
capital structure focus on differing aspects of debt and equity financing. Modigliani & Miller (1958) capital 
structure irrelevance proposition considers capital structure under perfect market conditions; trade-off theory 
focuses on tax advantage and financial distress; pecking-order is based upon the signaling effects of debt and 
equity issues and agency theory is about the role of debt financing in controlling the agency problems associated 
with free cash flows (Modigliani and Miller, 1958, 1963; Myers, 1977; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Myers & 
Majluf, 1984). Hence no unified model for determination of optimal capital structure has been presented. 
Furthermore, the existing empirical studies show differing results about the determinants of capital structure in 
different contexts. 
Finance literature is replete with research on determinants of capital structure. Many of these studies 
are empirical in nature showing the impact of different variables upon the level of debt used in capital structure. 
The results of these studies are divergent even with regard to same variables, the divergence being explained by 
different theories of financing. Myers (2003) had suggested that due to the severity of agency problems in 
developing economies, its impact on capital structure decisions should be studies in these economies. In Pakistan, 
there are few studies on capital structure determinants, the most recent being Sheikh & Wang (2011). These 
studies have emphasized on variables most commonly studied in other contexts e.g. profitability, firm size, 
growth opportunities, liquidity, tangibility of assets etc.  However, there is no research which has also focused on 
the agency problem and its impact on financing choices made by Pakistani firms. This study is important 
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because it provides evidence how agency problems effect capital structure decisions in Pakistani firms. 
Furthermore, this study uses panel data over an extended period of 10 years as compared to previous studies in 
Pakistan which have covered 6 years at most. 
This paper shows the impact of free cash flow (used a measure of agency problems), interest rates, 
profitability, firm size, growth opportunities, liquidity, asset tangibility, earnings volatility & non-debt tax 
shields on capital structure. It is a groundbreaking work in examining the effects of agency problems on 
financing decisions in Pakistani context. It provided insights about the impact of agency issues on capital 
structure. Moreover, it provides further empirical evidence about the factors which determine capital structure in 
Pakistan. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Capital Structure Theories 
Firms’ assets are financed either by equity or debt. It is this mix of debt and equity on the balance sheet which is 
called capital structure (Ross, et al, 2008). There has been an endless debate on the composition and optimality 
of capital structure in finance literature. Various explanations of the relative composition of debt and equity in 
balance sheet have been presented in capital structure theories (Myers, 2003). 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) irrelevance proposition was the first in modern thought on capital 
structure. MM model (1958) proposed that debt and equity financing does not affect the value of the firm. But 
this happens only when the financing decision takes place under perfect market conditions. However, real market 
situation is not that ideal. When perfect market conditions are relaxed, the choice of debt and equity start making 
a difference. This is the point which Modigliani and Miller (1958) themselves concluded. In their second 
proposition, Modigliani and Miller (1963) considered the tax deductible nature of interest payments and the tax 
advantages.  
The second theory of capital structure is the trade-off theory (Scott, 1977). It explains the financing 
behavior of firms in tax and bankruptcy risk conditions. The use of debt in capital structure has advantages (in 
form of tax deduction) and disadvantages (in form of financial distress or even bankruptcy) (Myers, 1977). The 
point where the advantages and disadvantages of debt balance out, is the firm value maximizing optimal capital 
structure which all firms move to achieve. 
Another theory explaining capital structure of firms is Pecking order theory (Myers & Majluf, 1984). 
This theory explains capital structure decisions in terms of information asymmetry which means that managers 
are more informed about the financial condition of the firm than outside investors. In case a firm issues shares in 
capital market, the investors may construe the already outstanding shares of the firm as overvalued and may 
place less value on newly issued shares. This gives a negative signal and increases the cost of new equity issue. 
To avoid this situation, firms prefer internal financing to debt and use equity as the last resort. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) presented the agency theory which says that managers do not always act 
in the best interest of shareholders. Managers may use free cash flow for their own perquisites rather than 
investing it in positive NPV projects. Thus a clash of interests between principal (shareholders) and agents 
(managers) arises. This agency problem can be mitigated by the use of more debt in capital structure as the 
payment of interest will leave less free cash flow at managers’ discretion (Jensen, 1986). 
Despite the various theories presented in past, the financing behavior of firms is still puzzling. “There 
is no universal theory of capital structure and no reason to expect one” and that “all capital structure models are 
conditional” (Myers, 2003). This is partly responsible for a widespread use of cross-sectional tests and variables 
in recent empirical studies that can be justified using either trade-off or pecking order theory. (Huang & Song, 
2006). 
2.2 Independent Variables 
There are various factors which affect the leverage level of firms. These factors vary in their influence on 
leverage. The most significant part of leverage variance is explained by intrinsic firm characteristics (42%), 
followed by time-level (36%), industry-level characteristics (12%) and country-level (3%). The remaining 7% 
variance in leverage is due to the combined effects of industry and country characteristics (Kayo & Kimura, 
2011). Since firm-level determinants play the most dominant role in determination of capital structure, they are 
discussed in detail in various empirical studies. 
2.2.1 Profitability 
Profitability is predicted by trade-off theory to be positively related to leverage because high profitability acts as 
a feed-forward for more use of debt and thus taking benefit of higher tax advantage. Pecking order theory 
predicts profitability has a negative impact on debt ratio because higher profits lead to greater availability of 
internal financing. This relationship is corroborated by several studies: (Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Huang & Song, 
2006; Sheikh & Wang, 2011; Tang & Jang, 2007; Viviani, 2008; Chen, 2004; Deesomsak, et al. 2004; 
Serrasqueiro & Rogao, 2009). On the basis of predominant empirical research, we hypothesize: 
H 1: Profitability negatively influences debt ratio. 
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2.2.2 Firm Size  
Studies which show the impact of firm size on debt ratio also have contradictory results. Some studies have 
empirically shown that firm size and debt level have a positive relationship (Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Huang & 
Song, 2006; Sheikh & Wang, 2011; Deesomsak, et al. 2004; Serrasqueiro & Rogao, 2009). This finding fits well 
with trade off theory which says that there are much less chances of bankruptcy in larger firms as they are well 
diversified. However, according to pecking-order theory larger firms have less debt because information 
asymmetry problem is not severe in large firms resulting in greater tendency towards equity financing. This is 
empirically supported by Chen (2004) and Ooi (1999). Since large firms can easily raise funds from debt 
markets and have lower chances of bankruptcy, it is hypothesized: 
H 2: Firm size positively influences debt ratio. 
2.2.3 Tangibility 
Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest a positive relationship between debt and tangibility of firms’ assets because it 
reduces the costs associated with information asymmetry by giving collateral security to debt issue. This is 
shown by several empirical studies: (Huang & Song, 2006; Chen (2004); Deesomsak, et al. 2004; Serrasqueiro & 
Rogao, 2009). In contrary, studies such as Sheikh & Wang, 2011 show an inverse relationship of firm size with 
debt. Viviani (2008) has found no significant relationship between debt level and firm size. Since more fixed 
assets are hoped to increase the debt capacity of firms, we hypothesize: 
H 3: Tangibility positively influences debt ratio. 
2.2.4 Growth Opportunities 
Firms with future growth opportunities tend to borrow less because growth opportunity can be considered as an 
intangible asset which cannot be collateralized. This is supported by Myers’ (1977) prediction that growth 
opportunities create a conflict of interest between debt and equity holders. Empirical evidence is there to support 
this relationship: (Huang & Song, 2006; Ooi, 1999; Deesomsak, et al. 2004). Study conducted by Chen (2004) 
show a positive relationship between debt and growth opportunities. He considers the Chinese peculiar 
institutional structure responsible for this deviation. Sheikh & Wang (2011) found no significant impact of 
growth opportunities on leverage level in manufacturing industry of Pakistan. We hypothesize: 
H 4: Growth opportunities negatively influence debt ratio. 
2.2.5 Non-debt Tax Shields 
Non-debt tax shield is shown by many empirical studies to have a negative impact on debt ratio (Huang & Song, 
2006; Deesomsak, et al. 2004). However, Sheikh & Wang (2011) show it insignificant in Pakistani 
manufacturing industry context. Debt has advantage in the form of tax-savings but it also brings peril in the form 
of financial distress. Therefore, firms prefer methods other than debt for gaining tax benefits. Depreciation and 
other non-debt tax saving shields can take be used for this purpose. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H 5: Non-debt tax shields negatively influence debt ratio. 
2.2.6 Earnings Volatility 
Greater volatility of a firm’s earnings imply that there will be a greater chances of a firm becoming unable to 
cover its fixed interest payments. This brings the firm on a more vulnerable position and reduces its debt 
capacity. Many empirical studies corroborate this negative relationship between earnings volatility and debt level 
(Sheikh & Wang, 2011; Delcoure, 2007). While there are other studies which show no significant effect of 
volatility on firm’s debt (Viviani, 2008; Deesomsak et al. 2004). Some studies have even suggested a negative 
impact of volatility on long-term debt level in software firms (Tang & Jang, 2007). So there is no consensus on 
the direction of relationship between earnings volatility and leverage. Since most of the empirical evidence point 
towards a negative relationship, we hypothesize: 
H 6: Earnings volatility negatively influences debt ratio. 
2.2.7 Free Cash Flow 
The free cash flow encourages managers to expand the size of the business so that more resources come under 
their control. Debt acts as a regulating factor to control this agency problem (Jensen, 1986). Free cash flow has 
been used as a proxy of agency problem. Contradictory evidence can be found in literature about the effect of 
free cash flow on leverage. According to the trade-off theory, more free cash flow results in higher debt levels 
since it is easy for such firms to raise debt (Stulz, 1990). Tang & Jang (2007) and Karadeniz et al. (2009) found 
no significant effect of free cash flow on leverage. While Miguel & Pindado (2001) show an inverse relationship 
between free cash flow and debt leverage. This is in corroboration of pecking order theory which says that high 
free cash flow makes available internal financing which is always preferable for the business thus restraining the 
firm from taking debt. Debt is used as a regulating mechanism by the owners to restrict the management’s 
discretion of using free cash flows in their own favor. Taking free cash flow as a proxy of agency problem, we 
hypothesize: 
H 7: Free cash flows positively influences debt ratio. 
2.2.8 Interest Rate 
Interest rate has a direct bearing on the cost of debt financing. Higher the interest rate, higher will the interest 
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payments made by the indebted firm. Empirical evidence shows that firms decrease their debt level with 
increasing interest rates (Ooi, 1999).  Moreover, the expectations of increasing interest rates make firms to 
switch from long term to short term debt (Bokpin, 2009). Hence we hypothesize: 
H8: Interest rate negatively influences debt ratio. 
 
3. Methodology 
The population considered in this study is all the non-financial companies listed on Karachi Stock Exchange. 
Among the total population, 130 companies were randomly selected for analysis. 17 companies were dropped 
from the sample because complete data of certain variables was not available. The final sample consisted of 113 
companies from various industries. The relevant data was obtained from Balance Sheet Analysis of Joint Stock 
Companies published by State Bank of Pakistan and from financial statements of the companies for a period of 
10 years (2002-2011). State Bank Analysis provides pertinent figures of key accounts taken from financial 
statements of listed companies. Some of the figures were not directly available in SBP analysis so they were 
calculated from the data available in SBP analysis and financial statements of companies. 
The dependent variable used in this study is debt ratio. The independent variables are: profitability, 
growth opportunities, liquidity, asset tangibility, firm size, non-debt tax shields, free cash flows, earnings 
volatility and interest rates. Their definitions are given in Table 1. Keeping in view the purpose of this paper, it is 
advisable to adopt the variables from existing literature since it will make the results of this study comparable 
with similar studies in other contexts. The book values are used for calculation of all variables as the data is 
based upon the financial statements. 
Table I Measurement of Variables 
Variables Measurement 
Dependent 
Variables 
 
Debt Ratio (DR) Debt ratio is defined here as the total debt divided by total assets. Long term debt has been 
used to measure leverage, according to theories of capital structure. However, in Pakistan, 
the bond markets are not well developed and most of the firms are of medium sizes which 
have limited access to debt capital markets. Short-term debt constitutes the major portion 
(in our sample, on average 73.4%) of the total debt of Pakistani firms; therefore, this 
overwhelmingly high proportion of short-term debt cannot be ignored while studying the 
capital structure. That’s why this study uses total debt instead of only long-term debt in 
measuring leverage. 
 
Independent 
Variables 
 
Profitability 
(PROF) 
 
Profitability is measured by net profit before taxes divided by total assets. Net profit before 
taxes has also been used in some studies including Sheikh & Wang (2011).  
Size (SIZE) Firm size is measured here by natural logarithm of total assets. “Total assets” has been used 
by many studies as a proxy of firm size e.g. Tang & Jang (2007) and Ooi (1999). In order to 
reduce the effect of large variation in values, we have used the natural log of total assets. 
Growth 
Opportunities 
(GROW) 
Growth opportunities are measure by sales growth divided by total assets growth (Sheikh & 
Wang, 2011) 
Tangibility 
(TANG) 
Ratio of net fixed assets to total assets (Sheikh & Wang, 2011) 
Earnings 
Volatility 
(EVOL) 
Standard deviation of EBIT during 3 years prior to time t. (Tang & Jang, 2007) 
Non-debt tax 
shields  (NDTS) 
Ratio of depreciation expense to total assets. Depreciation is used since it is the major 
element in non-debt tax shields. (Sheikh & Wang, 2011) 
Liquidity (LIQ) Current ratio is used as a measure of liquidity (Jong et al., 2008; Sheikh & Wang, 2011) 
Free Cash Flow 
(FCF) 
Ratio of free cash flow to total assets (Tang & Jang, 2007) 
Interest Rate 
(INT) 
Risk free interest rate of 3-month T-bills 
 
This studies uses panel data analysis techniques i.e. pooled OLS, fixed effects model and random effects model. 
Pooled OLS is used when the existence of group effects or individual effects in data are not considered. Since 
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this paper uses panel data which comprise of multiple cross sections and observations over several time periods, 
therefore, it is expected that cross section effects may be meddling in data. This problem can be overcome by 
using two popular econometric techniques namely, fixed effects model and random effects model. 
In fixed effects model, different constants for each cross section are used while the betas of individual cross 
sections remain constant. While in random effects model, the cross sectional constants are random rather than 
fixed. In order to decide which model is best explaining our estimation, Hausman test (1978) was used. The 
results of Hausman show that fixed effects model has more explanatory power for our study. The models 
discussed above – pooled OLS, fixed effects and random effects – are specified as follows: 
DRit= β0 + β1PROFit+ β2LIQit + β3FCFit+ β4INTit+ β5SIZit + β6TANGit + β7EVOLit+ β8GROWit+ β9NDTSit + Єit 
DRit = β0i + β1PROFit+ β2LIQit + β3FCFit + β4INTit + β5SIZit + β6TANGit+ β7EVOLit+ β8GROWit+ β9NDTSit + 
µit 
DRit = β0 + β1PROFit + β2LIQit+ β3FCFit+ β4INTit+ β5SIZit+ β6TANGit+ β7EVOLit+ β8GROWit+ β9NDTSit + Єit+ 
µit 
where: 
DRit= debt ratio 
PROFit = profitability 
LIQit    = liquidity  
FCFit      = free cash flows 
INTit       = risk free interest rate  
SIZit        = firm size 
TANGit    = assets tangibility 
EVOLit    =  earnings volatility 
GROWit  = growth opportunities 
NDTSit    = non-debt tax shields 
β0            = y-intercept 
β1 - β7      = coefficients of independent variables 
β0i                 = firm’s y-intercept 
εit            = stochastic error term 
µit            = error term 
εi             = cross-sectional error components 
i               = firm i 
t               = time t 
 
4. Empirical Results 
This section presents the results of different estimation models used in this study. The summary descriptive 
statistics of independent and dependent variables are presented in table II. The table shows that total debt 
constitutes 69 percent of the total assets financing. 
Table II Summary Statistics 
 Observations  Max  Min  Mean SD 
DRit 1130 4.15 0.00 0.69 0.47 
NDTSit 1130 0.45 0.00 0.04 0.03 
TANit 1130 0.97 0.00 0.48 0.23 
LIQit 1130 875.04 0.03 2.44 28.55 
SIZit 1130 12.20 3.48 7.92 1.55 
PROFit 1130 1.26 -0.54 0.07 0.15 
GROWit 1130 1026.41 -159.96 3.37 40.68 
EVOLit 1130 17016.39 0.00 416.57 1320.55 
FCFit 1130 2.65 -1.71 0.02 0.22 
INTit 1130 1.04 0.16 0.68 0.30 
Table III shows the Pearson correlation matrix of variables. In order to check whether multicollinearity exists 
among independent variables or not, the correlation terms are checked. As can be seen from thetable, the cross-
correlation terms are very small for all independent variables and hence multicollinearity cannot be suspected. 
The VIFs shown in the last column of the table also confirm that no multicollinearity exists among the 
independent variables.  
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Table III   Pearson correlation matrix 
  DRit NDTSit TANit LIQit SIZit PROFit GROWit EVOLit FCFit INTit VIF 
DRit 1  
NDTSit 0.126 1 1.17 
TANit 0.154 0.308 1 1.30 
LIQit -0.074 0.027 -0.008 1 1.02 
SIZit -0.607 -0.153 -0.526 0.356 1 1.36 
PROFit -0.330 -0.065 -0.366 0.085 0.499 1 1.22 
GROWit 0.028 -0.002 0.045 -0.005 -0.052 -0.047 1 1.00 
EVOLit 0.028 0.060 0.003 -0.004 0.012 0.072 0.012 1 1.35 
FCFit 0.159 0.147 -0.107 -0.050 -0.062 0.170 -0.010 0.149 1 1.11 
INTit 0.096 -0.080 0.002 0.046 -0.012 -0.070 0.013 0.097 0.038 1 1.05 
Having hypothesized that there are no cross-sectional differences among the data matrices, we first used pooled 
OLS regression model. The results of this model are presented in table IV. The R
2
 value is 0.1881 and F-statistic 
is significant. 
Table IV  The effect of independent variables on debt ratio(DRit) using pooled OLS estimation model 
Variable                      β       Standard Error                             t Prob.   
C 0.964451 0.083031 11.61562 0.0000 
EVOLit 3.21E-05 1.12E-05 2.867683 0.0042 
FCFit 0.398057 0.060366 6.594060 0.0000 
GROWit 7.71E-05 0.000313 0.245972 0.8057 
INTit 0.138109 0.042732 3.231949 0.0013 
LIQit -0.000822 0.000451 -1.824328 0.0684 
NDTSit 1.093241 0.516478 2.116725 0.0345 
PROFit -1.042613 0.095602 -10.90576 0.0000 
SIZit -0.049998 0.009558 -5.231241 0.0000 
TANit 0.076802 0.062775 1.223443 0.2214 
Notes:R2=0.1881; adj R2= 0.1816;  SE of regression=0.4272; F-statistic=28.84;Prob(F-statistic)=0.0000 
However, because our data is panel data, the existence of cross sectional effects on firms or groups of firms 
cannot be ignored. Therefore, panel data techniques called fixed and random effects models are used. Table V 
and VI present the results of these models. In table VII, the Hausman specification test results are reported.  
Since prob.(chi
2
) = 0.0001, therefore the alternative hypothesis of Hausman test is accepted and we use fixed 
effects model because it will give better estimation. 
Table V  The effect of independent variables on debt ratio(DRit) using fixed effects estimation model 
Variable                      β       Standard Error                             t Prob.   
C 0.866655 0.129532 6.690644 0.0000 
EVOLit 4.21E-05 8.13E-06 5.179257 0.0000 
FCFit 0.291669 0.034715 8.401840 0.0000 
GROWit 6.35E-06 0.000181 0.035083 0.9720 
INTit 0.130660 0.026104 5.005384 0.0000 
LIQit -0.001051 0.000271 -3.884934 0.0001 
NDTSit -0.532983 0.341767 -1.559491 0.1192 
PROFit -0.373707 0.072847 -5.130000 0.0000 
SIZit -0.025728 0.016424 -1.566470 0.1176 
TANit -0.083013 0.079184 -1.048347 0.2947 
Notes:R2= 0.7852;  Adj R2= 0.7594; SE of regression= 0.2316;  F-Statistic= 30.45;  Prob(F-Statistic)= 0.0000 
Table VI    The effect of independent variables on debt ratio (DRit) using random effects estimation model 
Variable                      β       Standard Error                             t Prob.   
C 0.940448 0.111517 8.433238 0.0000
EVOLit 4.09E-05 7.96E-06 5.140513 0.0000
FCFit 0.295842 0.034542 8.564820 0.0000
GROWit 2.09E-05 0.000180 0.116107 0.9076
INTit 0.139932 0.025068 5.582052 0.0000
LIQit -0.001044 0.000269 -3.883847 0.0001
NDTSit -0.491763 0.336206 -1.462685 0.1438
PROFit -0.434048 0.071037 -6.110146 0.0000
SIZit -0.039759 0.013338 -2.980942 0.0029
TANit -0.012437 0.071566 -0.173780 0.8621
Notes:R2= 0.1613; Adj R2= 0.1545;  SE of regression= 0.2343;  F-Statistic= 23.92; Prob(F-Statistic)= 0.0000 
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Table VII Hausman Specification Test Results 
Variable Fixed Random Var(Diff.) Prob.
C 0.000042 0.000041 0.000000 0.4772 
EVOLit 0.291669 0.295842 0.000012 0.2284 
FCFit 0.000006 0.000021 0.000000 0.3409 
GROWit 0.130660 0.139932 0.000053 0.2028 
INTit -0.001051 -0.001044 0.000000 0.8207 
LIQit -0.532983 -0.491763 0.003771 0.5020 
NDTSit -0.373707 -0.434048 0.000260 0.0002 
PROFit -0.025728 -0.039759 0.000092 0.1432 
SIZit -0.083013 -0.012437 0.001148 0.0373 
Notes:   Chi2 (9 df) = 33.93       Prob.> Chi2 = 0.0001 
 
As can be seen in table V & VI, earnings volatility (EVOL), free cash flows (FCF), interest rates (INT), liquidity 
(LIQ) and profitability (PROF) prove significant in results of both estimation models. While size (SIZ) is 
significant only in random effects model. Growth opportunities (GROW), tangibility (TAN) and non-debt tax 
shields (NDTS) are insignificant under both estimation models.  
 
5. Discussion of Results 
According to the empirical results of this study, debt ratio is significantly affected by profitability and liquidity. 
As expected, the signs of coefficients are negative, which means that firms with high profits and high liquidity 
use less debt in their financing. This finding is in line with pecking order theory (POT) which suggests that firms 
prefer using internally generated funds. Also it can be attributed to less developed capital markets in Pakistan 
and high information asymmetry. 
Free cash flow has a positive relationship with debt ratio and is statistically significant. This 
relationship can be explained by agency theory of capital structure which suggests that firms with high free cash 
flows tend to be more leveraged. This is a tactic to limit the opportunistic behavior of managers who are inclined 
to use the free funds for their own well being, instead of employing them in the best interest of owners (Jensen, 
1986). The high value of the coefficient (0.29) is indicative of the importance of agency issues in determining 
financing mix of the Pakistani firms. 
Contrary to the expected negative relationship of interest rates with debt ratio, this study found a 
significant positive impact of interest rates on debt ratio. This can be because this study has considered total debt, 
instead of long-term debt, as a measure of leverage. As Bopkin (2009) has pointed out that interest rate is 
positively related to short-term debt. Since short-term debt constitute the major portion of debt composition 
(73.4 %) in Pakistani firms, therefore, this positive relationship can be justified.  
The results also show that the effect of firm size (SIZ) on debt ratio is significant and negative under 
random effects model but it is insignificant in fixed effects model. These results can be explained in terms of 
pecking order theory, which considers information asymmetry as the foundation of capital structure decisions. 
Since information asymmetry is less severe in larger firms, they can issue sensitive securities like equity and, 
therefore, may issue less debt (Kester, 1986). The negative relationship can also be due to the fact that most of 
the firms in our sample are of small to medium size. The transaction costs borne by small firms to issue long 
term debt are relatively high which restricts them to financing through short term debts (Titman & Wessels, 
1988). Since we have considered total debt (which is predominantly composed of short term debt in Pakistan) as 
a measure of leverage, the negative relationship of size and short term debt as indicated by Titman & Wessels 
(1988) is also an explanation of the results found in this study. Earlier, Shah & Khan (2007) have also found no 
significant effect of size on debt level. However, most of the industry specific studies in Pakistan have reported a 
positive relationship of size with debt ratio. 
Earnings volatility (EVOL) is found to have a significant positive impact on debt ratio. In literature, a 
negative relationship has been established in many studies (Sheikh & Wang, 2011; Shah & Khan, 2007). The 
positive relationship found in this study can be attributed to a high short term debt to total debt ratio observed in 
Pakistani firms. This can be explained by economic theory as higher risk of bankruptcy makes it difficult for 
firms to obtain long-term debts. So they depend more on short term debts. 
The variables growth (GROW), non-debt tax shields (NDTS) were found to be insignificant in both 
models. This result supports the findings of Sheikh & Wang (2011). Tangibility of assets is also insignificant 
according to the results of this study. Tangibility is generally considered to have positive relationship with debt 
ratio because tangible assets have comparatively less asset specificity and are collateralisable for long-term debt. 
This insignificant result may be because total debt has been considered in this study. In Pakistan total debt 
consists of a dominant portion of short term debt which does not need any collateral and hence the tangibility of 
a firm’s asset does not matter much in Pakistani context. 
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6. Conclusion 
Capital structure decisions are one of the most important areas of managerial decision making. Due to the heavy 
costs of bankruptcy and financial distress, it is important to make capital structure decisions on firm foundations 
of reason. As discussed in the introduction of this paper, there exists no single model which can explain all 
capital structure decisions in all contexts. Due to the context sensitive nature of capital structure decisions, it is 
important to study empirically which model best explains debt decisions in a particular context. This study is an 
attempt to examine the determinants of capital structure in KSE-listed non-financial companies of Pakistan and 
exploring some new variables that have been studied in other contexts but not in Pakistan. The study uses panel 
data of 113 companies over a period of 10 years (2002-2011). 
The results of empirical analysis are as follows: Profitability and liquidity have a negative relationship 
with debt ratio. This is in alignment with pecking order theory. Free cash flows have a significant and positive 
impact on debt ratio, in accordance with agency theory. Interest rates are also positively related to debt ratio. The 
relationship of firm size with debt is negative but is significant only in random effects model. Earnings volatility 
was found to be positively related with debt level maintained by firms. This can be the result of considering total 
debt as a measure of leverage. The study could not find any significant relationship of NDTS, growth 
opportunities and asset tangibility with debt ratio. 
 
7. Limitations and Future Directions 
This study has the following limitations: This study has used total debt to measure leverage. Total debt includes 
both short term and long term debt. The strict concept of capital structure includes only long term debt. However, 
in Pakistan, the major portion (73.4% in our sample) of total debt is composed of short term debt. This is because 
most of the firms in Pakistan have medium sizes and thus have limited access to bond markets. Moreover, the 
debt markets in Pakistan are not well developed. In studying capital structure, this overwhelmingly high 
proportion of short term debt in total debt composition cannot be ignored. But including it also poses a problem 
as the behavior of some determinants like firm size, tangibility, volatility, may change. A comparative study of 
the relative impact of these determinants on the short term and long term debt levels, maintained by Pakistani 
companies, may unveil important results. 
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